Editorial note:
This panel of the Symposium, under the collective title "Psychoanalysis and democracy: from infancy onwards", consists of the following papers by Nergis Güleç and Eckehard Pioch, and will form the basis of their dialogue within the Symposium.
Another paper by Eckehard Pioch appears further down this page.

By Nergis Güleç

The theme of this conference, Democracy and Psychoanalysis in Europe: Past, Present and Future, could be challenging to think about in the shadow of wars, multiple crises and human catastrophes; at a time when democratic structures seem to be crumbling and becoming increasingly fragile, and when, in some places, simply thinking freely or speaking one's mind can carry very real consequences.

And yet, as we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the European Psychoanalytic Federation, there is also a sense of hope and joy.

The EPF was established in a Europe that had experienced unimaginable destruction. Sixty years later, when we look at what has accumulated through these decades;the scientific exchanges, committees, conferences, publications, friendships and collaborations,it is just remarkable how much has been created.

In this regard, it seems important to consider how the capacity for democratic functioning is born in the psyche, how it is established and sustained institutionally, and how it can be lost when thinking gives way to omnipotence, certainty, projection, and hatred. Perhaps it would be possible to develop my ideas around; democracy as a developmental achievement, as a psychoanalytic attitude/capacity, and EPF as a democratic psychoanalytic institution. Many questions come to mind; how does the capacity for democratic functioning arise in the first place? How does one learn to tolerate difference without experiencing it as an attack? How does one remain separate without becoming isolated, and belong without becoming swallowed or invaded? And, perhaps most importantly, how do we develop the capacity to think together when we do not agree?

These questions take us back to the very beginning. To infancy, to the earliest relationship between the individual and the environment, and to what Winnicott described as the development of an innate democratic factor (1950).

How does a democratic capacity develop?

It seems an ordinary good home, with good enough parenting, is where it all starts and that democratic capacity has a developmental and psychic trajectory beginning in the infant's relationship with the environment.

How one is allowed to have their own mind and have the freedom “to be” or the opposite; forced to adapt/react, be an extension of the other, to my mind, is where democracy becomes a developmental concept rather than a political one. The infant does not develop democratic thinking by being taught democratic principles. The infant gradually becomes capable of democratic relatedness through an environment in which its existence is recognized without being invaded, impinged on, and in which the other can gradually emerge as a separate reality. Such an environment both encompasses and liberates.

The mother initially adapts sufficiently to allow the infant to experience an illusion that they are one and that the baby is all-powerful; she is in complete harmony with her baby. On the other hand, gradual failure of adaptation during this process allows the infant to discover external reality. As reality is presented in small doses, the infant can begin to discover an external world that survives and exists independently of its wishes. The other can therefore become real without becoming persecutory. That leads naturally into what Winnicott defines as movement from object relating to object usage, subjective object to objectively perceived object.

Isn’t this what democracy precisely requires? That the other is real, separate, and entitled to exist beyond one's wishes. Thus the first democratic experience may be that one’s mind can exist alongside another’s.

The foundations laid at the beginning pave the way for the future state of being able to feel both separate and connected to others, a sense of union, belonging and at the same time boundedness, which is crucial for democratic functioning.

The infant learns that another mind can exist alongside one's own. The mature individual must then learn that another mind can think differently from one's own, and in a democratic environment, different minds continue to think and live together.

What threatens democratic functioning?

If the infant perceives reality and the existence of the environment prematurely, spontaneous creativity cannot manifest as a fundamental element in the infant's life, and compliance takes its place. In such a situation, continuing to be an infant means reacting or adapting to the caregiver's needs rather than maintaining the continuity of being. It might then become difficult and can impede the capacity to allow another “to be” and to have their own mind when the individual didn’t experience this in the first place. Rather than tolerating differences, it might result in such attitudes as reacting with infantile omnipotence, arrogance, thoughtlessness, withdrawal, compliance or attacks on meaning. If from the beginning the infant had such an opportunity “to be”, it might facilitate democratic functioning where diversity of opinion creates liveliness and food for thought and not a threat to one’s being.

Psychoanalysis reminds us that none of us—and no community—is entirely free from hatred, anger, envy, rivalry, destructiveness, or even the wish to do harm. These are feelings we would much rather disavow, dismiss, or locate in the “other,” outside ourselves. Psychoanalysis challenges this split and reminds us that, just as an idealized world is an illusion, an idealized psyche is an illusion as well. Also democracy…

Freud writes in “Thoughts for the times on war and death” (1915): “In reality there is no such thing as ‘eradicating' evil (p.281). These tendencies remain part of the human condition, even when they are hidden from view, and even when our civilized, mature selves succeed in keeping them at a distance.

In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud recalls to us again: “The fateful question for the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disturbance of their communal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction(p.145).”

Democracy therefore cannot be based on an idealized conception of human beings.

In a different context, what Winnicott underlines is similar and realistic(1950); if democracy is maturity and maturity is health, health is desirable, but it is not all or nothing. All healthy societies contain some proportion of antisocial or immature individuals, just as each person carries within himself that aspect (my addition), but a proportion that the society and individual can contain without submerging the democratic tendency is what is important.

Democracy is not once and for all; it is only an achievement at a point in time in a limited society and requires constant work. Perhaps similar to what M.Parsons( 2014) writes regarding the myth of completed analysis: “...analysts had to realize what they do is simply one element, at one particular stage in a patient’s lifelong psychic history” (p.144). Just as an analysis cannot be a final achievement of psychic health, democracy cannot be regarded as something permanent, a finished state. Neither can there be permanently achieved maturity nor permanently democratic institutions. All are ongoing processes requiring constant maintenance, reflection and renewal.

To live with this tension, to remain human in the presence of these impulses, requires a continued struggle, effort, and psychic work. To carry on thinking despite this struggle necessitates humility, curiosity, and the capacity to tolerate not knowing. This is why W. Bion’s warning against ‘arrogance’ is so important(1957). He understood arrogance as an attitude that places itself in the service of the death instinct, because it closes the mind to doubt, and ultimately to thinking itself. Arrogance cannot tolerate uncertainty and claims to know.

Perhaps the task before us is to recognize, without denial, the forces, immature and destructive aspects that exist within ourselves and within our societies. To tolerate the discomfort this recognition brings and to try to understand it without excusing it.

What does it take to think together?

Home is where we start from, but we need to go beyond and expand our horizon, and see other homes, psychoanalytic homes, open to scientific discussions, exchanges, widening our perspective which would allow us to have a look from different vertices.

Different minds, different histories, different analytic traditions and different political realities come into contact with one another. When something unknown enters the field of experience, confusion, anxiety, uncertainty, loss of familiar meaning, and emotional turbulence might be felt because one's previous way of understanding no longer works. The tendency might be immediately to restore order by evading, explaining, theorizing, or finding a familiar meaning. But eliminating the turbulence by establishing certainty prevents new thinking from emerging. If we think of developmental growth itself, with each developmental step, something new emerges, creating emotional turbulence, but evading it would only impede growth. Leon and Rebecca Grinberg(1989) write that “human development itself is a succession of migrations”, of finding ourselves out of place. This is a part of development, which allows for transformation from the beginning of life. But of course, these developmental changes, if experienced as being forcefully uprooted, might lead to fragmentation and disintegration.

Democracy requires us not to eliminate the turbulence produced by difference, but to develop the capacity to think within it. Thinking requires us to remain open to what we do not yet know, generating a new dimension of meaning through the coexistence of different perspectives. A work in progress of maintaining the capacity to think, differentiate, negotiate and recognize the other. And an institution needs to create a space in which these differences can coexist without either having to disappear.

How can an institution become a democratic environment?

In an institution, our differences can be contained within a shared third space without requiring sameness. It can function as a third that prevents binary relationships: my society- your society, my theory - your theory, my country - your country, my analytic culture - your analytic culture. Differences can be represented, discussed, negotiated and symbolized.

How can we think about EPF in this respect without idealizing, taking it for granted or diminishing its importance?

To my mind, EPF is a democratic space for scientific thinking and dialogue with intellectual freedom, fighting against the pressures of a ‘cancel culture’. EPF, as an institution, a third party, opens up a space for symbolisation.

If liberty, equality, fraternity are the 3 pillars of democracy it is possible to see a model of this in the EPF governance, the way the Board and General Assembly function. EPF can sustain democratic functioning, not because it is perfect, but because it has mechanisms through which imperfection, disagreement and conflict can be thought about. Like Winnicott's ordinary good-enough home, it is reliable enough to hold differences, stable enough to survive disagreement, and sufficiently non-intrusive to allow its members to think for themselves.

Han Groen Praken(1986, p.9)mentions that when EPF was being established, Federation was preferred rather than Association because the Federation indicated being more loosely linked. I thought this was important information highlighting EPF’s autonomy, to have its own voice, “neither exercising power nor wishing to exercise power”, as she points out (p.22). Perhaps there is something developmental in the very history of the Federation. To become a federation rather than simply remaining an extension of another institution required a movement towards autonomy without rupture; a finding of one's own voice while remaining in relationship with the larger psychoanalytic body: IPA. In fact, Han Groen Praken (p.25) mentions that in 1977, the EPF General Assembly met for the last time under the auspices of the IPA, in Jerusalem during the IPA congress and thereafter meetings took place at EPF congresses. This could become an institutional analogy to the infant's development: separating without losing the relationship. EPF historically developed its own identity without severing its relationship with IPA.

From a personal point of view, I have experienced EPF from different developmental positions over time and continue to do so: Candidate, Participant, Council member, General Secretary. It is almost a developmental narrative of my analytical journey within the EPF which has helped me grow and develop as a psychoanalyst.

I have been attending EPF congresses since I started my psychoanalytic training at Istanbul Psychoanalytical Association. As years went by, my passion and interest in the stimulating discussions and the enriching scientific programmes of EPF grew, leading me to attend them every year not only as a participant but also as a presenter and then as the organizer for the IPSO programme for candidates at EPF as the IPSO Vice President for Europe.

Then I had the opportunity to take part in the EPF’s governing bodies; first as a member of the Council when I was president of my society between 2022-2024, where I had the experience of thinking together with presidents of other societies in an atmosphere of collegial support, trust and friendship. Looking across the borders of one's country allows another dimension to psychoanalytic practice and theory, overcoming prejudices against what seems to be foreign. Furthermore, I thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to socialize with colleagues from different countries and backgrounds, to exchange ideas, learn from one another and think together. Then, from 2024, as the EPF General Secretary which enriched my experience of EPF from another perspective, also giving me the opportunity to have a deeper understanding of the responsibilities this position entailed. For example, facilitating communication and connection, keeping presidents informed and updated, made me aware of how much this contributes to a sense of belonging, community and human connectedness. Isolation is deadly for psychoanalysts, socially, and to think and learn, we need one another. Organizing the agenda and keeping the minutes of the General Assembly and the Board of Directors is not simply an administrative task, but that it is actually about containing, holding, digesting and working through, which helps sustain an institutional memory, making institutional thinking available to all and helping to keep the discussion alive. Within this role, I also started to learn how institutional functioning requires multiple loyalties to coexist without one becoming absolute; loyalty to one's own thinking, loyalty to one's analytic society, loyalty to the EPF Board, loyalty to members of the EPF General Assembly, loyalty to institutional responsibilities and loyalty to democratic procedures. The mature institutional position is not to eliminate these loyalties but to hold them in tension, finding an egalitarian distance. In short, I learned that to maintain a democratic functioning within my role is something essential and constant work in progress.

Octavia E. Butler(1998) beautifully wrote:

“When vision fails, Direction is lost, and when direction is lost, Purpose may be forgotten. When purpose is forgotten, Emotion rules alone. When emotion rules alone, Destruction... destruction.”

Perhaps this is why institutions matter. They can help us remember a vision when individual vision becomes clouded; they can provide direction without dictating thought; and they can help preserve a sense of purpose when the surrounding world becomes turbulent.

This brings us back to where we began; democracy, as I said, is challenging.

Democracy is difficult to think about precisely because it asks us to live with uncertainty, difference, conflict and the limits of our own knowledge. It asks us to relinquish omnipotence, to recognize the other as real, and to remain in relationship with those whose minds and experiences may be profoundly different from our own.

Psychoanalysis cannot guarantee that we will achieve this. Nor can any institution.

But psychoanalysis can offer something essential; a space in which what is difficult to think can become thinkable; in which destructive impulses need not immediately be enacted; in which difference need not become division; and in which turbulence can become the beginning of new thought.

And perhaps this is one of the tasks of the EPF as it enters its seventh decade; to continue creating the conditions in which democratic thinking can be renewed, through the capacity to think, tolerate uncertainty and remain in relationship.

*My acknowledgements to Michael Parsons for our initial discussion on this topic.

References

Bion, W(1957) On Arragonce In: Second Thoughts( 1967: 2005),p.86, London ; Karnac.

Bion, W. R. (1970 [1984]). Attention and Interpretation. In Seven Servants. Four works by Wilfred R. Bion. New York, Jason Aronson.

Butler, O.E.( 1998) Parable of the Talents, Public library

Freud, S. (1915)Thoughts for the times on war and death” in SE:14, Hogarth Press and the Inst. of Psychoanalysis

Freud, S ( 1930) Civilization and its Discontents. SE.21, London: Hogarth Press and the Inst. of Psychoanalysis

Grinberg L.& Grinberg,R.(1989) Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Migration and Exile, Yale University Press, New Haven

Groen-Prakken H. (1986). A European organization for psychoanalysis: why and how and when? An historical survey of the founding and development of the EPF. Psychoanalysis in Europe,26/27, 11-67.

Parsons, M( 2014)Living psychoanalysis from theory to experience ,London: New library of psychoanalysis, Institute of psychoanalysis)

Winnicott, D. W. (1950 [1980]). Some Thoughts on the Meaning of the Word ‘Democracy’. In Home Is Where We Start From: Essays by a Psychoanalyst. New York: Penguin Books.

 

Responsible Citizen and Totalitarian States of Mind

By Eckehard Pioch

Preliminary Remark

As some of the speakers, including Nergis Güleç, have rightly pointed out, the EPF was founded 60 years ago in a Europe that had suffered unimaginable destruction as a result of World War II; however, as a German colleague, I have to point out the following: It was Germany that was the source of this violence. It was in Germany where the fanatical supporters of the Nazi regime welcomed the ‘total war’, whose army brought the war to the whole of Europe. It was Germany that systematically murdered the Jewish population. Against the backdrop of Germany's history, the relationship between psychoanalysis and democracy carries special significance: The majority of the German population had not successfully maintained a democratic stance during the Nazi era; at the least, most people had come to terms with the political situation. This also includes the psychoanalysts in my society, the DPG, who took a highly ambivalent course of action in adapting to the requirements of National Socialism and, as early as 1933—shortly after the Nazis came to power—urged their Jewish colleagues to leave the DPG. Regarding the behavior of the non-Jewish analysts of the DPG who remained in Germany, Anna Freud offered the following assessment in 1946:

“It is quite certain that they were not Nazis. I believe it is equally certain that they were not heroes. But there isn't much sense in expecting people to be heroes, especially since they would all be dead if they had been” (Letter of 19 Dec. 1946 to J. Lampl-de Groot; A. Freud Papers/Library of Congress. Translation EP).

Despite these words of understanding from Anna Freud, the alienation of the DPG from international psychoanalysis—which had begun during the Nazi era—continued with the DPG’s not being readmitted to the IPV in 1949 and with the split in German psychoanalysis following the founding of the DPV in 1950. It took decades for the DPG to reconnect with the international psychoanalytic community: In 2009, the DPG became a Component Society of the IPV and, as a result, also a member of the EPF. For most of the 60 years we are celebrating today, we were not part of the EPF. In light of this backdrop and especially since I currently serve as president of the DPG it makes me all the more delighted to be able to contribute to this jubilee.

Maturity and Responsible Citizen

At a conference on anti-Semitism held in San Francisco in 1944, Ernst Simmel, a psychoanalyst who had emigrated from Germany, reflected on how to counteract pathological group formations that manifest themselves in a “mass mentality”:

“We cannot expect to prevent economic crises through psychology. However, we might be able to counteract panic- the emotional reaction to crises - by so influencing the character formation of the common man that he acquires a superego adequately equipped for reality testing. That capacity would help the individual to remain mature even under the stress of economic crises” (Simmel 1946, p. 66/67).

Simmel outlines a “longrange program” designed to guide students, through courses on social life, “to be guided in re-directing destructive tendencies into constructive channels” (ibid.). This educational task must also be carried out as early as in kindergarten and within the family, “with particular emphasis on the influence of the mother, since the basic preparation for superego development occurs during the first five years of life. (ibid., in italics in the original). This is in line with what Nergis Güleç writes about “good enough parenting” as a requirement for the development of “democratic capacity.” Simmel views democracy as a “normal group formation” and “the organised modern expression of civilization” (75/76). Individuals who are encouraged within democratic structures in the manner described above can develop an uncorrupted superego and, if necessary, defend it against those in power who appear as the personified superego. There is a mutual dependence here: Mature psychological development requires democratic conditions, and democracy depends on people with mature personalities.

What Simmel has in mind is what we today call the “responsible citizen”. This term refers not only to the capacity for sound judgment and self-determination, but also to the willingness to take responsibility for oneself and others and to be actively involved in society. From a psychoanalytic point of view, this goes along with what we mean by “maturity.” These include tolerance for ambivalence and ambiguity, and related to this: the absence of splitting, the capacity for love and concern, tolerance for frustration and negative emotions, the capacity for containment, the capability for symbolization and mentalization, the capability and willingness to change perspectives and to take a third position, etc.. However, it is worth noting that these qualities can never be fully achieved and that an idealized psyche is an illusion, as Nergis Güleç has already pointed out.

The Time of Monsters

When we look at the current political situation in many countries around the world, we must acknowledge that responsible citizens face a challenge. Strong polarization of views can be observed on all issues of fundamental importance—such as the climate crisis, war and peace in the Middle East or Ukraine, the economy, immigration, etc.—with no shared third position. Triangular formations are disappearing. Complementary relations prevail; each partner feels that his perspective is the only right one. This is accompanied by a constant state of arousal driven by social media and its algorithms.

Karin Zienert-Eilts (2025) describes the relationship between destructive populist leaders and their followers as “perverted containing,” which—unlike helpful containing—does not detoxify and transform destructive processes, but rather fuels them. The resulting permanent outrage is the “glue” that holds this destructive attachment together. It provides its followers with a sense of identity and belonging. The process of “perverted containing” must be kept going and even intensified in order to maintain its effectiveness.

In addition, populist leaders are causing confusion by often no longer striving for policy coherence but, on the contrary, creating extreme disruptions: Yesterday’s mortal enemy is today’s ally, and vice versa (Take as an example Trump and his recent rapprochement with North Korea, formerly part of the “Axis of Evil”). Of course, there have been contradictions in politics in the past as well, but these had to be legitimized in some way. For example, when Western governments, which, on the one hand, advocate freedom and democracy, supported dictatorial regimes in other parts of the world, they did so on the reasoning that, otherwise, those countries would fall prey to communism. That may have been somewhat hypocritical at times, but it was, after all, a rationalization that acknowledged that something here needed explaining. The new politics of disruption and splitting no longer seem to need this. It functions on a borderline level.

Antonio Gramsci is attributed with the following quote: “The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters”.¹ His intention was to describe the transitional period following the end of World War I and the decline of the old empires. However, this phrase also applies well to our current situation, in which old political constellations and alliances are breaking down and new challenges such as digitalization and AI are emerging. The fears resulting from this uncertainty give rise to monsters—whether they are projections or real.

This quote also seems to me to fit well with individual internal object relationships, and here I see a connection to what Jan Abram (2026) writes about the significance of the surviving object. A stable surviving object is needed to cope with the fears of the transitional phase and to avoid being exposed to monsters. Jan rightly points out, that the democratic and totalitarian states of mind, which are associated with surviving or non-surviving objects, prevail in each of us.

Psychoanalysis as a “Process of Internal Democratization”

This leads us to the question of how we should deal with it when the current political situation enters the consulting room, especially when patients express totalitarian or racist views. Some of our colleagues are convinced that neutrality is no longer appropriate in these cases, since psychoanalysts are committed to human dignity and fundamental democratic values. While I certainly agree with the latter, I cannot subscribe to the view that neutrality can be set aside in these cases. Neutrality and abstinence are indispensable epistemological prerequisites for engaging in psychoanalytic work. Problematic views always reflect corresponding internal object relationships that need to be analyzed. In this way—psychoanalysis can be understood as a “process of inner democratization”, to put it in the words of Klaus Grabska (2025). The roles of the psychoanalyst, the intellectual, and the activist should be kept distinctly separate.

But even if we, as analysts, try to remain neutral, our patients will attribute certain views to us in one way or another. That is part of the analytical process and has to be analyzed.

Internal Object Relationships and Political Situation

Some authors have attempted to adapt the terminology used to describe individuals’ inner world to the description of political situations as well. Herbert Rosenfeld (1988), for example, applied his concept of an internal “Mafia gang” to Hitler and Germany during the Nazi era. Igor Kadyrov (2025) has examined the role of the ego-destructive superego in today's Russia under Putin's rule. Conversely, metaphors drawn from the realm of politics serve to illustrate the inner world of individuals. I would now like to present case material that illustrates the predominance of an internal totalitarian object world against the backdrop of inadequate holding and containing in early childhood.

There are two potential misconceptions I’d like to address first: The prevalence of an internal totalitarian object world does not necessarily mean that anti-democratic views are expressed on a conscious level. In any case, that is not the case with this patient. Nor can it be assumed that all supporters of destructive populism have experienced trauma in early childhood. However, if containing is failed, it can be assumed that there is a higher level of vulnerability, which may then lead to an increased tendency toward regression.

Case material

“Just imagine it this way: I get into a taxi and tell the driver my destination. He starts the car and drives off at high speed. I realize he’s not at all heading in the direction I want. When I point this out to him and ask him to change the route, he tells me he doesn’t understand German and asks me to speak English. So I repeat my request in English. Now he says he doesn't speak English and asks me to speak German with him. When I do, he asks me to speak English again. And this keeps happening over and over. There's no way for me to get through to this driver and get him to take me to my requested destination”.

With this image, my patient Ludwig is trying to convey to me that it is impossible for him to give up a certain view of himself and his relationship with significant others, even though he knows that this view is distorted and very painful. What this means, specifically, is that Ludwig is expecting guests this weekend. He's under pressure to put together a perfectly tailored, highly appealing visiting program. Everything had to be just right, because otherwise he would be deeply despised, deemed worthless, and possibly even outcast. Rationally, he would be able to recognize that this idea is wildly exaggerated and absurd. Yet another part of him clings to this cruel and heartless view.

Ludwig calls this other side “my unconscious self.” On closer examination, this isn’t entirely accurate: for this other side is by no means unconscious to him; on the contrary, he is all too aware of it, and it dominates his life—in particular, it significantly limits his ability to form relationships and forces him into a state of near-total retreat. This is a case of ego splitting. This phenomenon, as is well known, is not a conflict between unconscious instinctual demands originating in the id and the ego, but rather a conflict between two different states of the ego, or rather, two different states of inner experience. In this context, Sigmund Freud writes:

“All these phenomena, the symptoms as well as the restrictions on the ego and the stable character-changes, have a compulsive quality: that is to say that they have great psychical intensity and at the same time exhibit a far-reaching independence of the organization of the other mental processes, which are adjusted to the demands of the real external world and obey the laws of logical thinking. They [the pathological phenomena] are insufficiently or not at all influenced by external reality, pay no attention to it or to its psychical representatives, so that they may easily come into active opposition to both of them. They are, one might say, a State within a State, an inaccessible party, with which co-operation is impossible, but which may succeed in overcoming what is known as the normal party and forcing it into its service. If this happens, it implies a domination by an internal psychical reality over the reality of the external world and the path to a psychosis lies open” (Freud 1939, p. 75).

“A state within a state”—with this metaphor, Freud very accurately describes the power of Ludwig’s tormenting way of experiencing the world, which apparently cannot be influenced by his perception of an external reality that stands in contrast to it.² Rosenfeld would later use the metaphor of a powerful gang led by a leader to describe this internal organization, a concept that was subsequently further developed by Steiner.

Ludwig's depiction of the dictatorial, arbitrary and unapproachable taxi driver, to whom he is helplessly at the mercy of, vividly illustrates the inner dynamics discussed here. Let's return to the session: In response to Ludwig's description, I say, “So helpless and powerless—and all alone.” Ludwig agrees. Both my own intervention and Ludwig’s reaction to it evoke a mixture of indignation and sadness in me: Why, exactly, “all alone”? I’ve been accompanying him through hundreds of sessions, trying to understand his inner world as precisely as possible. Why can’t he make more use of me as a present and responsive presence? Why can’t I reach Ludwig more deeply? Now I feel like a helpless passenger in the back seat of the taxi, while my driver, Ludwig, omnipotently rebuffs my attempts to reach an agreement with him about the route, just as described above. During a moment of silence in the meeting, I am struck by a memory of a television talk show I had watched many years ago: They were interviewing a taxi driver who had been forced at gunpoint by a mass shooter to drive him around. This taxi driver was of Russian-German descent and had fought in the Russian army during the Chechen War. The skills he had acquired there now helped him free himself from the clutches of the murderous hostage-taker. He steered his vehicle into a field when the opportunity arose and rolled out of the moving taxi, in which the gunman was still inside. It makes sense that this memory came to me as a kind of heroic rescue fantasy to defend myself against my own feelings of powerlessness—at a moment when I felt helpless in my relationship with Ludwig.

But jumping out of the moving “analysis taxi” isn’t an option for me. Instead, as part of the treatment, there’s also intensive work being done on the traumas Ludwig has suffered: A recent relationship experience—one that had been very disappointing for him—had led him to begin analysis. As work progressed, a memory surfaced of a scene that took place when Ludwig was six years old: His mother had set out on an outing with him and his brother, who was still a baby. They were caught in a heavy rain shower. The three sought shelter in a park kiosk with open sides, where quite a few people were already standing, so it was a bit cramped and the three had to stand at the edge of the kiosk. His mother, with the baby, actually had a dry spot under the roof. Although Ludwig was holding his mother's hand, he had literally been standing “in the rain” the entire time. His mother did not notice this, and he did not protest or otherwise draw attention to his hardship. I see in this scene a screen memory that illustrates how Ludwig experiences his defining object-relations experiences: As an outcast in relation to an object that is well-intentioned—he is, after all, held by his mother’s hand—but which nevertheless fails to provide consistent, sufficiently good care. As the analysis progresses, Ludwig then learns that he was left to cry as a baby.

It is these disappointing experiences of object relations that lead to self-object differentiation appearing to be diminished over the course of treatment. This creates a shared destiny, a “we” as a unified whole. Perceiving the analyst as a separate person would, at first, make me the target of Ludwig’s intense object disappointment. However, for Ludwig, the experience of separation would also lead to intense shame, because it would involve being seen by his analyst - a person who exists independently of him. In order for him to survive psychically, Ludwig must first develop a greater capacity for symbolization. Progress has been made in this area, as the reported narratives also show. It is important, though, to bear in mind the paradox inherent in psychoanalytic treatment technique: Growth—the “inner democratization” of the totalitarian internal object relations—is made possible by renunciation: The analyst maintains a stance of neutrality and abstinence and refrains from “re-education” or other more pedagogical interventions—even if this may sometimes be challenging for him.

Notes

¹ In fact, this is a very freely translated version of the Italian original: “In questo interregno si verificano i fenomeni morbosi più svariati”, which exactly translates to: “In this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” (Oltermann 2026). Not quite so pithy, however, I consider it legitimate to rely on the very loose translation attributed to Slavoj Žižek (2010) to convey what I want to say.

² This metaphor also brings to mind the paranoid fear of a “deep state” that some populist leaders are spreading today.

References

Abram, J. (2026): The Democratic Self: on democratic object relations in the EPF leadership role. EPF-Homepage

Grabska, K. (2025): Psychoanalysis Needs Democracy. Discussion of Eran Rolnik’s Paper ‘Political Caesura and the Analyst’s Freedom of Thought’ In EPF-Bulletin 79: 138-141

Güleç, N. (2026): Psychoanalysis and democracy; from infancy onwards. EPF-Homepage

Freud, A. (1946): Letter of 19. 12. 1946 to J. Lampl-de Groot; A. Freud Papers/Library of Congress.

Freud, S. (1939): Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 23:1-138

Kadyrov, I. M. (2025): Angst. Tod und das Ich-zerstörende Über-Ich. In Pioch, E. et.al.: Zwischen Angst und Hoffnung. Psychoanalyse in Zeiten gesellschaftlicher Krisen. 101-128

Oltermann, P. (2026): ‘The time of monsters’: everyone is quoting Gramsci – but what did he actually say?. The Gardian, 14^th of February 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/14/the-time-of-monsters-everyone-is-quoting-gramsci-but-what-did-he-actually-say

Rosenfeld, H. A. (1988 [1984]). Narzißmus und Aggression. In Kutter, P. et.al.: Die psychoanalytische Haltung. 375–391

Simmel, E. (1946): Anti-Semitism and Mass-Psychopathology. In: Anti-Semitism. A Social Disease, New York (Int. Univ. Press), 33-78

Zienert-Eilts, K (2025): »Wehe denen, die Böses gut und Gutes böse heißen …« Psychoanalytische Überlegungen zur Entwicklung der Anfälligkeit für Verschwörungsnarrative und für »pervertiertes containing«. In: Pioch, E. et. al.: Zwischen Angst und Hoffnung. Psychoanalyse in Zeiten gesellschaftlicher Krisen. 39-64

Žižek, S. (2010): Zeit der Monster. Ein Aufruf zur Radikalität. Le Monde diplomatique: https://monde-diplomatique.de/artikel/!361634